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IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that a motion for an award of costs, 
filed after the entry of judgment, does not delay the entry of judgment for purposes of 
appeal until the motion is resolved? 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The rules of central importance to this appeal are set out verbatim in Appendix A 
andB. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Giffin submits that the only facts relevant to the issue presented are as 
follows: 
On April 12, 2004, Beddoes filed a complaint against Giffin alleging malicious 
prosecution. (R., at 1-9.) Giffin filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R., at 43-45), 
and on September 22, 2005, the trial court entered a judgment in Giffin's favor, 
dismissing Beddoes' complaint against Giffin (R., at 196-97). On September 29, 2005, 
Giffin filed a Request for Costs. (R., at 198-210.) On October 19, 2005, Beddoes filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Request for Costs. (R., at 211-13.) On 
November 2, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying Giffin's request for costs. 
(R., at 227-28.) 
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On December 22, 2005, more than thirty days after the September 22, 2005 
judgment was entered, Beddoes filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., at 229-30.) On January 
17, 2006, Giffin filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on grounds that Beddoes' 
Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. (See Appendix C.) On March 30, 2006, the Utah 
Court of Appeals granted Giffin's Motion for Summary Disposition, holding that "[t]he 
September 22, 2005 order granting summary judgment and dismissing Beddoes's claims 
was the final, appealable judgment" and that because Beddoes's notice of appeal was not 
filed within thirty days after entry of final judgment, the courl lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal. (See Appendix D.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issue before this Court is whether the filing of a post-judgment request for 
costs extends the time for appeal. This Court should rule that such a costs request does 
not extend the time for appeal for three important reasons. First, it is an established rule 
of law in Utah that the addition of costs to a judgment that has previously been entered 
does not affect the judgment's finality for purposes of appeal. Utah courts, including this 
Court, have specifically held that the issue of costs is immaterial and collateral and 
therefore does not affect a judgment's finality. 
Second, Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides 
that if a case is appealed on its underlying merits, an award of costs abides the final 
determination of the case. Thus, if a judgment is appealed, as in this case, an award of 
costs cannot be final and appealable until the substantive case is finally decided. To hold, 
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as Beddoes advocates, that an award of costs must be finalized before a judgment 
becomes appealable, and appeals on the underlying merits and of costs awards must be 
brought together, would completely eviscerate Rule 54(d)(1). 
Third, holding that a post-judgment request for costs extends the time for appeal 
will result in a waste of judicial resources and may force courts to decide and parties to 
litigate a costs award twice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED NIELSON AND 
PROMAX IN CONCLUDING THAT BEDDOES' NOTICE OF APPEAL 
WAS NOT TIMELY FILED. 
A. Under Rules Enunciated in Nielson and ProMax, a Motion for an Award 
of Costs, Filed After the Entry of Judgment Does Not Affect the 
Judgment's Finality. 
Utah courts, including this Court, have unequivocally ruled that the addition of 
costs to a judgment, which has already been entered, does not affect the finality of the 
judgment for purposes of appeal. Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 132-33 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); ProMax v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, ffifl 1-14, 998 P.2d 254. In Nielson, the court 
held that an amendment to a judgment, which reflected an award of costs to the 
prevailing party, "did not create a new judgment for purposes of determining the 
timeliness of appeal, and the time [for] appeal commenced to run from the date of the 
original judgment." Nielson, 888 P.2d, at 133. Similarly, in ProMax, this Court affirmed 
Nielson, specifically stating that costs "are usually small statutory amounts or liquidated 
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amounts, [and] can be added later to a judgment without affecting its finality," ProMax, 
2000 UT 4, at t i l . 
The rationale underlying the rules announced in Nielson and ProMax is that the 
addition of costs to a judgment "[does] not affect any substantive rights running to the 
litigants." Nielson, 888 P.2d, at 133; ProMax, 2000 UT 4, at^fll. This is because under 
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the prevailing party is entitled to 
costs "as of course." Thus, an addition of costs to a judgment is simply a clerical, 
redundant, immaterial, non-substantive change. Nielson, 888 P.2d, at 133; ProMax, 2000 
UT 4, at t i l . 
A necessary corollary to the rule announced in Nielson and ProMax is that a 
motion for costs does not affect the finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal. 
Because Rule 54(d)(1) grants costs to a prevailing party as a matter of course,1 a motion 
for costs is simply a procedural formality. Such a motion is not any more substantive 
than the act of amending a judgment to reflect an award of costs. Such a motion does not 
affect the substantive rights of the parties, and therefore cannot affect a judgment for 
purposes of appeal. 
1
 Rule 54(d)(1) leaves no discretion to the court in awarding costs to the prevailing party. 
See Lvon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f76, 5 P.3d 616. 
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This proposition is supported by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.2 Rule 
4(b)(1) specifically sets forth motions - a motion notwithstanding the verdict, a motion to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and a 
motion for a new trial - that extend the time for appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1). A 
motion for costs is noticeably absent from Rule 4(b)(l)'s list of motions. This is because 
the common denominator of the motions listed under Rule 4(b)(1) is that they affect the 
substantive rights of the litigants. As discussed, under Nielson and ProMax, it is 
indisputable that a motion for costs does not affect the substantive rights of the litigant. 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Giffin's motion for costs did not 
extend the time within which Beddoes was required to file a notice of appeal. 
B. Beddoes Incorrectly Asserts that Nielson and ProMax are Inapposite. 
/. Beddoes Incorrectly Argues that the Holdings of Nielson and 
ProMax are Dictum, 
Beddoes' arguments that Nielson and ProMax are "inapposite" are incorrect on 
several levels. First, without explaining why, Beddoes argues that the statements made 
by the Utah Court of Appeals and this Court in Nielson and ProMax (addition of costs to 
a judgment does not affect the judgment's finality) are merely "dictum," "superfluous 
This proposition is also supported by the Federal Rules of Appellate and Civil 
Procedure. Under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, although a motion 
for attorneys fees may extend the time for appeal, a motion for costs will not, under any 
circumstance, extend the time for appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). See also, Moody Natfl 
Bank v. GE Life & Annuity Assur. Co., 383 F.3d 249, 250-253 (5th Cir. 2004) (motion to 
tax amount of costs may not be treated as motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 59(e) for purposes of extending time for appeal). 
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language," and "suspect," thereby suggesting that these statements do not have binding 
force. See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 13, 15-16 ("Although ProMax referred to Nielson 
as authority for the proposition that court costs can be added to a judgment without 
affecting its finality, such reference was purely dictum."). In doing so, Beddoes fails to 
recognize that central to Nielson was whether the appeal was timely filed and therefore 
whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal. 888 P.2d, at 132-33. 
Formulation and application of the rule that the addition of costs to a previously entered 
judgment does not affect the judgment's finality was essential to determining this issue. 
Similarly, a central issue in ProMax was whether ProMax's appeal was timely. 
This issue turned on whether the addition of attorneys fees to a previously entered 
judgment extended the time for appeal and whether Nielson was applicable. This Court 
ultimately held that the addition of attorneys fees to a judgment materially affects the 
litigants' rights, whereas the addition of costs does not. In so holding, this Court cited 
Nielson, which stated that when "no attorney fees are involved but only court costs, 
which are usually small statutory amounts or liquidated amounts, such costs can be added 
later to a judgment without affecting its finality." ProMax, 2000 UT 4, ^fl2. The rule 
that Beddoes characterizes as dictum was essential to this Court's decision, and Beddoes 
cannot avoid its force. 
2. Beddoes Incorrectly Argues that Nielson is Inapposite. 
Second, Beddoes incorrectly argues that Nielson is distinguishable because (a) the 
nature and substance of the underlying judgment in Nielson was not modified in any way, 
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and (b) Nielson did not involve any dispute over the recoverability or amount of court 
costs. Regarding (a), the fact that the judgment in Nielson was not substantially modified 
actually unifies Nielson and the present case. In Nielson, the court considered whether 
the amendment of a previously entered judgment to add costs constituted a substantial 
modification - whether the addition of costs was "of sufficient importance to change the 
character of the judgment." Nielson, 888 P.2d, at 133. The court concluded that the 
addition of costs to a previously entered judgment did not substantially modify the 
judgment for purposes of appeal. As explained above, the principle that the addition of 
costs does not substantially modify a previously entered judgment for purposes of appeal 
is directly applicable to this case. Under Nielson, it necessarily follows that a motion 
seeking the addition of costs to a previously entered judgment does not seek to 
substantially modify the judgment and therefore does not affect the judgment for 
purposes of appeal. 
Regarding (b), the fact that there was no dispute over whether costs should be 
awarded is trivial and does not prevent this Court from applying Nielson to this case. 
Under Nielson, regardless of whether the non-prevailing party disputes the award of 
costs, because costs are awarded to the prevailing party as a matter of course, any 
modification of a previously entered judgment to reflect an award of costs is non-
substantive and does not affect the judgment for purposes of appeal. 
Finally, Beddoes incorrectly argues that because Nielson was decided prior to 
Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998), Nielson is inapplicable to this 
7 
case. By so arguing, Beddoes argues that Meadowbrook overruled and is inconsistent 
with Nielson, This is not the case. Meadowbrook addressed whether a prevailing party 
waives its right to attorney fees if it fails to present evidence of attorney fees or move the 
court during trial to allow evidence of such fees to be presented after trial. 959 P.2d, at 
117. This was not the issue in Nielson, and Meadowbrook in no way affects Nielson's 
holding that the addition of costs does not modify a previously entered judgment for 
purposes of appeal. 
3. Beddoes Incorrectly Argues that ProMax Was Misapplied. 
Third, Beddoes spends a significant portion of his brief discussing the difference 
between ProMax and Nielson, and urges this Court to disregard ProMax, in part, because 
ProMax "concerned a dispute over the recoverability of count costs and attorney fees, 
[and] the instant case deals only with court costs." See, Brief of Appellant, at p. 16. 
However, the simple fact remains that while Nielson and ProMax do not present identical 
fact patterns as this case, they both hinge on the same proposition: costs "are usually 
small statutory amounts or liquidated amounts [and] can be added later to a judgment 
without affecting its finality." ProMax, 2000 UT 4, ^12. The fact that costs may be 
disputed in one case and not disputed in another is immaterial to the rule that a request 
for costs does not affect the finality of a judgment. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
FINAL JUDGMENT RULE, 
Beddoes contends that the court of appeals' ruling violates the final judgment rule. 
See, Brief of Appellant, at p. 11 ("Such decision runs counter to the final judgment rule 
as expressed in Meadowbrook and its progeny."). Again, Beddoes is wrong. Beddoes 
fails to cite to any Utah authority stating that a judgment is not final until requests for 
costs are resolved by the trial court Nielson and ProMax expressly contradict Beddoes' 
argument since they state that a judgment is final and appealable, even if the judgment is 
later amended to include an award of costs. 
This Court should not, as Beddoes urges, construe Loffredo v. Holt to require that 
requests for costs be decided before a judgment can be considered appealable. In 
Loffredo, this Court stated, "[w]e stress that the final judgment rule does not stand for the 
proposition that the lower court need only resolve the majority of the claims for us to 
entertain the case. Rather, it requires that all claims, including requests for attorney fees, 
be decided in order for a decision to be appropriately appealed to this court." 2001 UT 
97, at f 14, 37 P.3d 1070. Loffredo does not state that requests for costs must be decided 
for a decision to be appealable. To construe this statement to include costs would nullify 
the established precedent set forth in Nielson and ProMax, which is that a decision is 
final and appealable notwithstanding the fact that all requests for costs have not been 
resolved. 
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Importantly, the statement made by this Court in Loffredo that "all claims" must 
be decided is not inconsistent with Nielson and ProMax. Nielson and ProMax make clear 
that addition of costs or requests for costs are collateral requests that do not affect the 
substantive rights of the parties. Thus, under Loffredo, a request for costs is not a 
substantive "claim" that must be resolved before a judgment becomes appealable. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECLINED TO EXTEND 
THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE TO REQUIRE RESOLUTION OF 
REQUESTS FOR COSTS BEFORE A JUDGMENT BECOMES 
APPEALABLE. 
Beddoes' argument that this Court should disregard established precedent and rule 
that requests for costs must be resolved before a judgment becomes appealable is 
unavailing. First, Beddoes fails to cite any cases from Utah or other jurisdictions that 
support Beddoes' argument. Second, Beddoes5 argument requires this court to 
completely disregard Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states 
that an award of costs is not appealable until final resolution of the underlying case. 
Third, requiring requests for costs to be resolved before a judgment is appealable will be 
a greater drain on judicial resources than not requiring resolution of requests for costs 
before a judgment is appealable. Fourth, because costs awards are fundamentally 
different than attorneys fees awards, costs decisions are rarely appealed and do not drain 
judicial resources. 
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A. Beddoes' Argument Completely Eviscerates Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Which States that an Award of Costs is Not 
Appealable Until the Underlying Action is Finally Resolved. 
Rule 54(d)(1) effectively states that no costs can be awarded until the appellate 
process is concluded. Beddoes would have the Court turn that rule on its head by 
requiring that requests for costs be resolved before a judgment becomes appealable. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) states, "costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal 
or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection 
with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of 
the cause" Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). Under this rule, if the underlying 
action is appealed, the award of costs is held in abeyance until the action is finally 
resolved and a prevailing party is declared. To hold that requests for costs must be 
resolved before a judgment becomes final and appealable, would eviscerate Rule 
54(d)(1). 
Rule 54(d)(1) makes a crucial distinction between the way post-judgment requests 
for costs and post-judgment requests for attorneys fees should be treated for purposes of 
appeal. There is no provision that corresponds to Rule 54(d)(1) for attorneys fees. 
Unlike post-judgment awards for costs, awards for attorney fees do not abide a final 
determination of a case; they are immediately appealable. In contrast, under Rule 
54(d)(1), an appeal of a post-judgment award of costs can only be ripe for appeal under 
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one of two circumstances: (a) there is no appeal of the underlying action; or (b) a 
substantive appeal was made on the underlying action, which was subsequently resolved. 
Thus, unlike awards for attorneys fees, the Court's concerns for judicial economy 
and preventing "piecemeal appeals" as expressed in ProMax do not apply to requests for 
costs. Obviously, under scenario (a), there is no danger of piecemeal appeals and waste 
of judicial resources if the underlying action is not appealed. Under scenario (b), because 
an award of costs is subject to a "final determination of the cause," an award of costs 
cannot be final, and thus appealable, until a final determination is reached; in other 
words, until the appellate process has been exhausted and until the trial court has 
complied with remand instructions, costs awards are not appealable. Thus, even under 
scenario (b), there is no potential for piecemeal appeals. At most, a potential exists for a 
separate appeal of costs after a final determination has been reached, which, as discussed 
below, is unlikely. 
In sum, Beddoes is mistaken in advocating that "there is no compelling reason for 
any distinction to be made between post-judgment costs and post-judgment attorney 
fees." Brief of Appellant, at p. 18. Requiring a resolution of cost requests before a 
judgment becomes appealable would nullify Rule 54(d)(1). 
3
 The Utah Judicial Council Rules of Administration (the "JCRA") require the Judicial 
Council to follow certain procedures in modifying the rules of civil procedure. Section 2-
203 of the JRCA requires the Judicial Council, prior to final action on any rule, to: 
(A) email notice of the proposed rule and an invitation for 
comment to the governor, the chairperson of the Judicial 
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B. Requiring Requests for Costs to be Resolved Before a Judgment 
Becomes Appealable is a Greater Waste of Judicial Resources Than Not 
Requiring Resolution of Costs Requests. 
By preventing costs awards from being final until the appellate process has been 
exhausted, Rule 54(d)(1) preserves judicial resources. Under Beddoes' demand that 
court costs be resolved prior to appeal, judicial resources would be wasted. Consider the 
following hypothetical: Party A prevails at trial and files a motion for costs. Party B 
objects to Party A's motion for costs. The issue of costs is briefed and heard and judicial 
resources are expended. The trial court awards costs to Party A. Party B appeals the 
underlying judgment and the award of costs. On appeal, the trial court is reversed and the 
Rules Review Committee, the director of the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel, the Boards, the 
Executive Director of the Commission on Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice, the chair of each of the Utah Supreme 
Court's Advisory Committees on Rules of Procedure, 
Evidence, and Professional Conduct, the Executive Director 
of the Utah State Bar, each active member of the Utah State 
Bar, the proponent of the rule, and any other person or agency 
identified by the Council as requiring notice. The notice shall 
include a summary of the proposed changes and identify the 
URL where the full text of proposed rules is available; 
(B) publish the proposed rule and an invitation for comment 
in a regularly published law reporter service; 
(C) allow at least 45 days between publication and final 
action on the rule; and 
(D) consider all comments submitted. 
Respectfully, if this Court wishes to nullify Rule 54(d)(1), the procedure set forth in the 
JRCA must be followed. 
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underlying judgment is vacated. On remand, Party B prevails. After judgment is entered 
in favor of Party B, Party B submits a motion for costs, which again requires additional 
judicial resources to be heard and decided. 
This hypothetical illustrates the wisdom of Rule 54(d)(1), which states that an 
award of costs must await resolution of all substantive issues on appeal. By requiring 
that the resolution of costs await an exhaustion of the appellate process, Rule 54(d)(1) 
spares trial courts and parties from having to decide and litigate a cost award twice - once 
before an appeal and once after the appellate process has concluded if there is a different 
prevailing party on remand. This Court should not heed Beddoes' request to nullify Rule 
54(d)(1) since to do so would be to create a wasteful drain on the resources of litigants 
and the Utah courts. 
C. Compared to Post-Judgment Attorney Fees Awards, Cost Awards Are 
Rarely Appealed. 
Under Rule 54(d)(1), the possibility of a party appealing a costs award alone is 
remote. Costs are usually miniscule compared to attorneys fees, which can amount to 
significant sums of money. Indeed, this Court in ProMax observed that costs "are usually 
small statutory amounts or liquidated amounts." ProMax, 2000 UT 3, at ^12. Because 
costs are relatively miniscule, in most cases, it simply does not make economic sense for 
a party to appeal a costs decision, even if the party believes the decision is incorrect. 
However, if an award of attorneys fees is relatively large, as is often the case, it makes 
economic sense to appeal the award. 
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Further, as a practical matter, the number of cases in which the issue of costs is the 
only issue on appeal is rare. For example, in 2005, the case cited by Beddoes, Fielden v. 
Hansen, 2005 UT App. 426 (see Appendix E), in arguing that costs determinations are 
often appealed, was the only case decided in 2005 in which the issue of costs was the 
only issue on appeal. See, Brief of Appellant, at p. 20. In conclusion, Beddoes' 
argument that the application of Nielson and ProMax to this case and other similar cases 
will result in a waste of judicial resources is an unfounded parade of horribles and should 
not persuade this Court to overrule its established precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in holding that a post-judgment motion for 
costs does not extend the time for appeal of the underlying judgment. The court of 
appeals' decision is supported by established precedent and by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Beddoes has not produced authority or compelling reasons to justify the 
obliteration of established precedent and Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court of appeals' decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this 10th day of October, 2006. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Sean A. Monson \) 
Jared L. Inouye 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of October, 2006,1 caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to be served via U.S. Mail, first-
class postage prepaid, on the following: 
William P. Morrison 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 
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Appendix A 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(1) 
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other 
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than 
costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. 
Appendix B 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(b)(1) 
If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following 
motions, the time for all parties to appeal from the judgment 
runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings 
of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would 
be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Appendix C 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 17 2006 
Sean A. Monson (7261) 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(801)438-2000 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WILLIAM G. BEDDOES, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
GARY GIFFIN, ; 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
i MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) DISPOSITION AND REQUEST FOB 
) DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 
) 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
) APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
) Supreme Court Case No. 20051154-SC 
) District Case No. 040907525 
Defendant and Appellee, Gary Giffin ("Giffin"), by and through his counsel, and pursuant 
to Rule 10 of the Utah R. of App. P., hereby moves the Court to enter an Order dismissing the 
appeal filed by Plaintiff/Appellant William G. Beddoes ("Beddoes"). Beddoes' Notice of Appeal 
was not timely filed and this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear his appeal. The final judgment 
appealed from was entered on September 22, 2005 and Beddoes did not file his Notice of Appeal 
until December 22, 2005, 93 days later. Further, the appeal is frivolous. Giffin's counsel 
informed Beddoes' counsel that Beddoes' appeal was untimely but Beddoes' counsel has refused 
to withdraw the appeal. Accordingly, Giffin is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
Rule 33 of the Utah R. of App. P. This Motion is supported by a Memorandum in Support filed 
concurrently herewith. 
DATED this 1^ day of January, 2006. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
>ean>(. Monson 
torneys for Defpfidant/Appellee 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this i ]j |_ day of January, 2006,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND REQUEST FOR DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 33 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, to: 
William P. Morrison 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 





IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
William G, Beddoes, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Gary Giffin, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20051154-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 30, 2006) 
2006 UT App 130 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 040907525 
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn 
Attorneys: William P. Morrison and Grant W.P. Morrison, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Sean A, Monson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Billings. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellee Gary Giffin moves to dismiss this appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction and also seeks sanctions under rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
On September 22r 2005, the district court entered an order 
granting summary judgment and dismissing Beddoesfs complaint with 
prejudice on the merits. On September 29, 2005, Giffin moved for 
an award of costs under rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. On November 2, 2005, the district court denied the 
request in a signed minute entry. Beddoes prepared a formal 
order, which was signed and filed on November 28, 2005. Beddoes 
filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment on December 
22, 2005, Giffin argues that the appeal must be dismissed 
because the September 22, 2005 order granting summary judgment, 
rather than the November 28, 2005 order denying costs, was the 
final, appealable judgment. 
The jurisdictional issue is addressed in ProMax Dev. Corp. 
v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, and Nielson v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Nielson, we stated that an 
amendment to a judgment clarifying that the prevailing party was 
entitled to recover costs "did not create a new judgment for 
purposes of determining the timeliness of appeal, and the time 
[for] appeal commenced to run from the date of the original 
judgment." Nielson, 888 P.2d at 133, In ProMax, the Utah 
Supreme Court denied a motion to dismiss an appeal filed after 
entry of an order awarding a liquidated amount of attorney fees, 
but more than thirty days after the original judgment dismissed 
the complaint on the merits. The supreme court concluded: 
Where attorney fees are awarded to a party, 
whether denominated as an item of "costs" or 
not, and the amount is not stated in the 
judgment rendered on the merits of the case, 
and evidence must be taken afterwards by the 
trial court either by affidavit or live 
testimony, there is no final judgment for the 
purposes of appeal until the amount of the 
fees has been ascertained and granted. 
However, when, as in Nielson, no attorney 
fees are involved but only court costs, which 
are usually small statutory amounts or 
liquidated amounts, such costs can be added 
later to a judgment without affecting its 
finality. 
Promax, 2000 UT 4 at ^ 12. 
The September 22, 2005 order granting summary judgment and 
dismissing Beddoes1s claims was the final, appealable judgment. 
As the prevailing party, Giffin sought to recover costs under 
rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however, 
Giffin did not seek an award of attorney fees. The addition of 
costs to the judgment, if the request had been granted, would not 
have affected the finality of the September 22 order for purposes 
of appeal. Because Beddoes*s notice of appeal was not filed 
within thirty days after entry of final judgment, we lack 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
In support of the request for sanctions under rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, counsel for Giffin asserts 
that he wrote to counsel for Beddoes stating that the appeal was 
not timely and also stating his intention to seek sanctions under 
rule 33 if the appeal was not voluntarily dismissed. Beddoesfs 
counsel declined to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. Giffin seeks 
an award of attorney fees as a sanction for filing a frivolous 
appeal. Although Beddoesfs arguments are inconsistent with both 
ProMax and Nielson, we liberally construe them as good faith 
arguments for a modification of the existing case law and deny 
Giffin's request for sanctions on that basis. 
20051154-CA 2 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but deny the 
request for sanctions under rule 3 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
fluntfl/J.&ZuX. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, >Ss-
Associate Presiding Judge 




2005 UT App 426 
Betty Fielden, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Brent C. Hansen, Defendant and Appellee-
Case No. 20041058-CA, 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Filed October 6, 2005. 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, 010907198, The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Carlos J. Clark, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Kristin VanOrman, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Orme. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
The only issue on appeal is whether the district court exceeded the permitted range of discretion in 
awarding costs for two trial exhibits to Brent C. Hansen. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) governs awards of costs and provides that "costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Under this 
rule, the party who claims costs must submit a memorandum including "the items of his costs and 
necessary disbursements in the action." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). "A trial court's decision to award the 
prevailing party its costs is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 
98,tl0, 17 P.3d 1122 (citing Young v. State, 2000 UT 91,f4, 16 P.3d 549). 
Hansen sought and obtained an award of costs incurred for preparation of enlarged photographic and 
medical exhibits used at trial. "That [Hansen] chose to have these documents reproduced on poster board 
does not make them a 'necessary disbursement1 under rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,124, 31 P.3d 1147. 
Page 2 
To the contrary, "'trial exhibits are expenses of litigation and not taxable as costs.'" Id. at f25 (quoting 
Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at f 14) (additional citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the district court 
exceeded the permitted range of discretion in awarding costs for the two trial exhibits in the amount of 
$194.88. 
Accordingly, we vacate the award of costs for trial exhibits. 
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge, and Gregory K. Orme, Judge. 
